Mercer Law Review
Volume 48
Number 3 Articles Edition

Article 15

5-1997

The Jurisdiction of Trademark and Copyright Infringement on the
Internet
James H. Aiken

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Aiken, James H. (1997) "The Jurisdiction of Trademark and Copyright Infringement on the Internet,"
Mercer Law Review: Vol. 48 : No. 3 , Article 15.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol48/iss3/15

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Comment

The Jurisdiction of Trademark and
Copyright Infringement on the Internet

I. INTRODUCTION
The unbounded territory known as cyberspace poses many jurisdictional questions. This Article presents and attempts to answer some of
these questions as they relate to intellectual property ownership. The
first section gives some background information on the Internet. The
second section introduces some of the problems faced by owners of
intellectual property who utilize the Internet. The third section
discusses the jurisdictional questions posed by Internet infringment
litigation. The fourth section discusses personal jurisdiction generally.
A case study of existing cases dealing with Internet infringment follows
and the Article concludes with a proposal for the most efficient and
effective solution.
LI.

BACKGROUND ON THE INTERNET

It is no longer just chic or hip to have a web page on the Internet.
The Internet is now a necessity for most large to medium sized
businesses and some small businesses. Experts predict that the Internet
will account for 1.3 percent of the nation's economy, or $45.8 billion in
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revenues by the year two thousand.' Why are so many businesses
attracted to the Internet? Because consumers are attracted to it. By the
end of 1996, the total number of online subscribers was estimated at
18.1 million, up from 6.3 million in 1994.2 In response to this synergetic
growth, the potential for conflict between trademark or copyright owners
and infringers is also increasing. Businesses and individuals now have
the capacity to provide places to go on the Internet, containing virtually
any type of information, protected or not, for a possible fifty-two million
people.'
"Places" or hosts on the Internet are accessed using Internetworking
Protocol Addresses ("IP addresses"). The Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority ("LANA") is responsible for the assignment of IP addresses to
users. LANA delegates the administration of IP address applications and
registrations to InterNIC Registration Service, operated by a private
firm called Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI").4 IP addresses are represented as strings of digits divided into parts, or fields. Periods usually
separate the fields in the IP address.5 A typical Internet address might
be 132.76.249.197. This format is cumbersome and inconvenient, making
it difficult for users to remember and use the address. A facility called
the Domain Name Service ("DNS") has made access to IP addresses
easier to use by equating mnemonic designations with IP addresses.6
Internet applications (browsers such as Netscape and Explorer)
seamlessly refer to the DNS when a domain name is called for and direct
the user to the appropriate IP address. The general format for a domain
name is [subdomain].[subdomainl.[domain].[field].
The field, or top-level domain, to the right of the domain name is a
well specified and regulated area of the Internet. Each domain name is
assigned a domain field based on its affiliation: commercial (.com);
educational (.edu); governmental (.gov); military (.mil); network operator
(.net); or miscellaneous organization (.org). Countries are assigned twoletter domain fields, including France (.fr); Germany (.de); and United

1. Laura B. Smith, FrontierEconomics; Internet presence almost necessity, PC WEEK,
Dec. 11, 1995, at El.
2. Bill Pietrucha, Online SubscriberNumbers Climb To Over 18 Million, NEWSBYTES,
Feb. 6, 1997.
3. David Bender, Emerging PersonalJurisdictionalIssues on the Internet, PRACTICING

LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, 453 PLI/PAT 7, 9, Sept. 1996.
4. Dan L. Burk, TrademarksAlong the Infobahn:A FirstLook at the EmergingLaw of
Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (1995), <http://www.urich.edu/<<tilde>>jolt/-

vlil/burk.html>.
5. Id. at 11.12.
6. Id.
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Kingdom (.uk).7 The domain is the designation of the entity, such as
the name of the company or organization. Examples of domains are
microsoft.com and mercer.edu. The number of domains on the Internet
was estimated at 828,000 in January of 1997 (see Table 1).
Table 1: Semi-Annual Estimates of Internet Hosts and Domains'
Date
Jan
Jul
Jan
Jul
Jan
Jul
Jan.
Jul
Jan

97
96
96
95
95
94
94
93
93

I

Hosts

Domains

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

16,146,000
12,881,000
9,472,000
6,642,000
4,852,000
3,212,000
2,217,000
1,776,000
1,313,000

828,000
488,000
240,000
120,000
71,000
46,000
30,000
26,000
21,000

A subdomain can be any division of the domain, such as departments of
an organization, as in irs.ustreas.gov, or more typically, the organization
of the location's contents, such as "www" for World Wide Web pages or
"gopher" for gopher servers usually found at universities.9 The IANA,
also responsible for assigning domain names, has delegated to InterNIC
the operation of a name registry. InterNIC assigns domain names on a
first-come, first-serve basis, and any entity registering a domain name
may do as it wishes with that name: use it, reassign it, or simply hold
it unused. Domain names are fully portable because they have no direct
connection with IP addresses, except through the DNS, and can be
transferred to a new machine or site if the name holder moves."0 It is
the domain name that is often remembered or guessed by users when
trying to access an organization. With increased competition due to the
increased number of domains, companies are finding it increasingly
valuable to have easily remembered and distinguishable domain names,

7. Id. at 13.
8. Network Wizards, Internet Domain Survey (Jan. 1997), available in World Wide
Web, http://www.nw.com/zonefWWW/report.html; see also M. Lottor, Internet Growth
(1981-1991), Request for Comments: 1296 (Jan. 1992), available in World Wide Web,
http:/www.nw.eom/zone/rfc1296.txt.

9. Burk, supra note 4, at 10.
10. Id. at 14.
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usually equivalent to established, recognizable, and valuable trademarks. 1
III.

TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT ISSUES ON THE INTERNET

One source of potential conflict between owners of intellectual property
and potential infringers is the use of trademarks as domain names by
the infringer. 2 The technical limits of domain names can lead to
confusion and deception with regards to trademarks. For example,
organizations cannot use stylized fonts or formats, designs, or even
capitalization to distinguish themselves from other organizations.'s
Another difficulty in distinguishing domain names arises from the lack
of context in the Internet medium. There is a greater risk of confusion
in the marketplace as users cannot distinguish between different lines
of business as they can in real space.' 4
An Internet address is not just a reference to a source of information;
it is often the link between the buyer and seller or advertiser and
audience. "From a commercial standpoint, it is the billboard component
which is the came of this electronic enchilada, and everyone wants a
bite." 5 The importance of being able to utilize the strength of a
trademark by allowing users to access the owners via the domain name
is often the highest priority among organizations with an Internet
presence. Unreliable and difficult to use search engines16 are inadequate substitutes for typing "ford.com." 7
Another source of potential conflict between intellectual property
owners and potential infringers is the infringement of copyrights. s
Internet users can produce their own web pages and, with a few clicks
of a mouse, could potentially fill the screen of anyone who accesses the
site with copyrighted material. 9 Many large organizations, from 20th

11. Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Note, Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: Trademark
Protection for Internet Addresses, 9 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 483, 484 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
13. Dueker, supra note 11, at 484.
14. Id. at 494.
15. Id. at 497.
16. Search engines such as Yahoo, Excite, and Webcrawler retrieve adresses by
searching for keywords. A search for "cars trucks american" might return a reference to
Ford Motor Company's web site, along with Chevrolet, Chrysler, and General Motors, and
any other site containing these keywords (probably thousands).
17. Dueker, supra note 11, at 496.
18. See, e.g., Constance Sommer, Point!Click!Lawsuit!Hollywood honchos angry about
images on the Net, YORK DAILY RECORD, Jan.9, 1997, at 01.
19. Amy Harmon, Web Wars: CompaniesGet Tough on Rogues Studios and Fortune500
firms target unauthorizedInternet sites that feature theirproducts.Crackdown affects fans
as well as foes, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1996, at Al. See also Sommer, supra note 18, at 01.

19971 TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 1335
Century Fox to K-Mart, are aggressively seeking out copyright infringers
So far, most of the
on the Internet and threatening litigation.20
infringers have been either small scale fans setting up "unofficial WWW
sites" or vengeful ex-employees berating employers. 21 The only issues
the infringers raise in response are usually in the form of hateful e-mail
(a.k.a. "flames"), but the issues they raise often have merit and are in
part the subject of President Clinton's proposed National Information
Infrastructure Copyright Act. 22 Presently, however, the laws governing
intellectual property in cyberspace are questionable and quite possibly
the subject of future litigation as more dedicated and legally resourceful
infringers get involved.
The bottom line is that litigation over intellectual property issues
related to the Internet is inevitable. Given the vast number of
intellectual property owners putting their marks and works on the
Internet and the ease with which others can infringe on those marks,
curbing infringement is likely to become a high priority with owners.2 3
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH INTERNET INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION
When the mere threats by intellectual property owners no longer make
potential infringers shut down their sites or remove offending material,
owners will have to sue to enforce their rights. One question that needs
to be answered, and is as yet unclear, is where to sue. The physical
locations of the infringers and owners can be virtually unlimited.
Anyone with a computer and a phone line located anywhere in the world
can access the Internet and publish or distribute offending material. Do
intellectual property owners have to seek out and determine the location
of infringers and bring suit there or is it possible to bring suit somewhere more convenient and less costly to the intellectual property
owner?24
In the early days of the Internet and computer bulletin boards,
individuals openly trafficked unauthorized copyrighted and trademarked
material with an above-the-law attitude coined "the spirit of the
Internet."2 5
In 1994, one infringer actually defended himself by

20.

Harmon, supra note 19, at Al.

21. Id.
22. Id. The proposed updated copyright laws would specifically prohibit piracy in
Cyberspace and slap offenders with up to $250,000 in fines and five years in jail. Sommer,
supra note 18, at 01.
23. See Harmon, supra note 19, at Al; Sommer, supra note 18, at 01.
24. William J. Cook, FourInternet JurisdictionCases Break Rule of Thumb, CHICAGO
LAWYER, Oct. 1996, at 76.

25. Id.
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claiming that because 45,000 other computer bulletin boards across the
country posted copyright material, he should not be liable for his
infringement.'
During this "information wants to be free" 7 time period, Internet
usage was limited to small time bulletin boards without international
access. Individual networks were not connected and the sharing of
information was limited.2" The injury to intellectual property owners
was small and did not justify the legal fees necessary to fully protect
copyright and trademark rights.2 9 The result was infrequent litigation;
but when suit was brought, it was usually brought at the defendant's
location. 30 This practice became the rule, and this unfortunate "rule of
thumb" made protection of intellectual property rights on the Internet
inconvenient and expensive, and opened the door to more damaging
infringement as the medium gained popularity.31
The face of the Internet has changed vastly since the development of
the "rule of thumb." 2 Almost fifty million people have access to over
ninety thousand networks.3 3 Aggressive intellectual property owners
are seeking more convenient and cost-effective means of protecting their
works and marks. 4
V. SUMMARY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Any exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant outside of a
defendant's home forum is limited by constitutional due process. In
InternationalShoe u. Washington, 5 the Court laid the foundation that
a defendant must have "certain minimum contacts with [the forum],
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.' 3 6 A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the defendant either is
present in the forum, known as general jurisdiction, or where the
with the forum give rise to specific jurisdiction over
defendant's contacts
37
the nonresident.

26. Sega Enter. Ltd. v. MAPHIA BBS, 857 F. Supp. 679, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
27. Harmon, supra note 19, at Al.
28. Cook, supra note 24, at 76.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 2, 8.
33. Cook, supra note 24, at 76.
34. Id.

35. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
36. Id. at 316.
37. Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
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An exercise of general jurisdiction requires "continuous and systematic" contacts between the defendant and the forum." General jurisdiction is difficult to assert because of the extent of contacts required within
the forum state; some commentators have even suggested that general
jurisdiction ought to be limited to the defendant's home base.39 Where
a defendant is present in the forum, the defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction in the forum's courts for any cause of action that arises
anywhere in the world.4 ° Even if a defendant's contacts with the forum
are not related to the cause of action, personal jurisdiction will be
available.4
In order to support an exercise of specific jurisdiction, on the other
hand, the nonresident defendant's mirnimum contacts with the forum
must give rise to the particular controversy. 2 Thus, whether the
requisite minimum contacts exist is determined by examining the
relationship between the defendant, the forum and the litigation.'
Determining if specific personal jurisdiction is available is a fact-specific
inquiry as to whether a forum's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant comports with due process.
This vague and imprecise standard as to whether the exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction meets the requirements of the fairness test
in InternationalShoe has led to further refinements by the Supreme

Court. In Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court," the Court listed
five factors to determine fundamental fairness: (1) "the burden on the
defendant"; (2) "the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute";
(3) "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief";
(4) "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies"; and (5) "the shared interests the
several states have in furthering fundamental substantive social

38. Id. at 415 n.10. In Helicopteros, Texas was asked to assert jurisdiction over a
Colombian corporation (Helicol) that had done business in Texas for several years. The
cause of action was based on a helicopter crash in Peru that killed four American
passengers. Helicol had purchased the helicopter from a Texas firm and was using it to
transport the American employees. The Texas Supreme Court asserted general jurisdiction
over Helicol because of its "numerous and substantial" contacts with the forum and the
United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 419. See also Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (finding substantial unrelated contacts adequate for
jurisdiction).
39. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction,101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 667-70
(1988).

40. Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18,
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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policies." 5 Courts generally use a three-prong test that has been
developed to determine generally whether the assertion of specific
jurisdiction is constitutional: (1) the defendant must purposefully avail
itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum;4 (2) the
cause of action must arise out of the defendant's activities in the forum;
and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be fundamentally fair under the
five fundamental fairness factors enunciated in Asahi.47 Most importantly, the defendant's conduct remains the central concern of the
jurisdictional analysis."
In addition to constitutional due process limitations, each state has its
own law for extending personal jurisdiction over defendants located
beyond the boundaries of its own territory. 49 These state long-arm
statutes can be very broad, limited only by federal due process, or more
narrow, carving out small parts of the state's constitutionally permitted
authority.5" For example, the Georgia long-arm statute authorizes
specific personal jurisdiction over any defendant who "(1) [tlransacts any
business within this state; [or] (2) [clommits a tortious act or omission
within this state" and such exercise comports with federal due process.5 The federal due process analysis is only appropriate after it is
first established that the defendant has committed one of the acts
enumerated in the long-arm statute.52 There is an unresolved question
in Georgia as to whether jurisdiction under the "[tiransacts any
business" provision requires more contacts with the forum than does the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.5 However, "[in
cases where jurisdiction is based on the defendants' tortious act, there
is no question that the Georgia long-arm statute gives Georgia courts the
45. Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal JurisdictionLabyrinth, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 531, 539 (1995). See also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.

46. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
47. Weintraub, supra note 45, at 540.
48. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (holding that
defendant must anticipate having to defend actions in a state where defendant satisfied
the minimum contacts requirement by deliberately exploiting the state's market).
49. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 (1982).
50. JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERALS, at 85 (6th ed.
1993). Compare R.I. GEN. LAwS § 9-5-33 (1985) (Permitting courts to assert jurisdiction
over any nonresident person amenable to suit within the state and having the necessary
minimum contacts required by the Constitution) with N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 302
(McKinney 1990) (Permitting the exercise of jurisdiction only as to those matters arising
from the conduct that gave rise to the cause of action).
51. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 (1982).
52. McDonnell v. Roy E. Beatty & Assoc., 203 Ga. App. 807,808-09,418 S.E.2d 95,9697 (1992).
53. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Scott's Furniture Warehouse Showroom, Inc., 699 F.
Supp. 907, 915 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
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power to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants to the full extent allowed by constitutional due process. ""
The importance of the state long-arm statutes in trademark and
copyright litigation is found in rules 4(e) and 4(f) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure."5 Federal law provides no means by which service
may be effected upon individuals in copyright and trademark litigation."6 Rules 4(e) and 4(f) provide that when a federal statute does not
authorize service upon foreign defendants, the service may be made in
accordance with the forum state's service of process provisions. 7
Additionally, courts have generally held that actions for trademark or
copyright infringement sound in tort." Therefore, the power of a court
over a nonresident defendant in a copyright or trademark infringement
action is measured by the state's long arm statute to the extent it varies
from the requirements of federal due process. 9
VI.

EXISTING CASE LAW DEALING WITH INTERNET INFRINGEMENT

While the cases dealing with jurisdictional issues of trademark and
copyright infringement on the Internet are few, the existing ones provide
some guidance. The cases establish a continuum, consistent with well
developed personal jurisdiction principles, that is grounded on the
nature and quality of commercial activity conducted on the Internet.'
Situations in which the defendant clearly does business in the forum on

54. Id.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e),(f).
56. But see Boltons Trading Corp. v. Killiam, 320 F. Supp. 1182, 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a) governs both venue and personal jurisdiction in copyright
actions). Compare with Micromanipulator Co., Inc. v. Bough, 558 F. Supp. 36, 37 (D. Nev.
1982) (court treats § 1400(a) as a venue statute); Airola v. King, 505 F. Supp. 30, 31 (D.
Ariz. 1980) (court refers to § 1400(a) as the copyright venue statute); Burns v. Rockwood
Distributing Co., 481 F. Supp. 841, 845 at n. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (§ 1400(a) is in reality a
venue provision); Donner v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1229, 1234
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (court refers to § 1400(a) as the federal copyright venue statute); Battle
Creek Equip. Co. v. Roberts Mfg. Co., 460 F. Supp. 18, 21-22 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (court
treats § 1400(a) as a venue statute); Mode Art Jewelers Co. v. Expansion Jewelry Ltd., 409
F. Supp. 921,922 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court refers to § 1400(a) as the copyright venue statute);
Geo-Physical Maps, Inc. v. Toycraft Corp., 162 F. Supp. 141, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (§ 1400(a)
relates to venue and not personal jurisdiction).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), (f). See also Securities Training Corp. v. Securities Seminar,
Inc., 633 F. Supp. 938, 940 n.4. (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
58. See, e.g., Union Nat'l Bank v. Union Nat'l Bank, 909 F.2d 839, 843 n.10 (5th Cir.
1990); Store Decor Div. of JAS Int'l v. Stylex Worldwide Indus., 767 F. Supp. 181, 183
(N.D. 1111991); OGGI Cosmetics, Ltd. v. OGGI Intl, 1990 WL 78302 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Payne
v. Kristofferson, 631 F. Supp. 39, 43 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
59. Securities Training Corp., 633 F. Supp. at 940 n.4.
60. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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the Internet combined with other, more traditional means of doing
business such as entering into contracts with forum residents or
continuous and extensive transfers of information from the defendant to
the forum state, result in the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.6 However, when the defendant's contacts with the forum
via the Internet are passive, only making information available to those
who access the site from the forum state, the forum state often does not
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.62 It is this end of the
spectrum that is less clearly defined.' The following analysis begins
with the "clearly doing business" cases and concludes with seemingly
contradictory cases.
The first case, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
is CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson." Defendant Richard Patterson, a
resident of Houston, Texas, subscribed to CompuServe's network
information service, located in Columbus, Ohio." Patterson uploaded
two shareware applications known as WinNav and Window Navigator
for distribution on the CompuServe network." To become a shareware
provider, Patterson entered into a Shareware Registration Agreement
("SRA") with CompuServe.6 7 The SRA established an independent
contractor relationship between Patterson and CompuServe, whereby
Patterson made his shareware available through CompuServe and other
CompuServe subscribers could download the files and, if they chose to
do so, pay for them." The SRA, which provided that it be governed by
and construed in accordance with the laws of Ohio, was agreed to by
Patterson in Texas and then transmitted to the CompuServe computer
system in Ohio.'9 CompuServe began to market a product similar to
the shareware developed by Patterson and in December 1993, Patterson
notified CompuServe that the terms "WinNAV," "Windows Navigator,"
and "FlashPoint Windows Navigator" were common law trademarks
owned by Patterson. 0 CompuServe changed the name of its products,
but Patterson persisted, demanding at least $100,000 to settle his

61. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
62. See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 973 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

63. Compare Bensusan, 973 F. Supp. 295 with Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set,
Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1260-61.
Id.
Id. at 1261.
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potential claims." Additionally, the claims threatened a $10.8 million
loss for "CompuServe.72 CompuServe filed a declaratory judgment
action in the federal district court for the Southern District of Ohio,
relying on the court's diversity subject matter jurisdiction, seeking a
declaration that it had not infringed any common law trademarks of
Patterson.
The district court refused to hear the declaratory
judgment action holding that CompuServe had failed to establish
personal jurisdiction over Patterson.74 The Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that Patterson's contacts with the forum were sufficient under
the Due Process Clause to support the exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction over him. 75 The Ohio long-arm statute extends to the
federal constitutional limits of due process. 7 Using the three-prong
test to determine personal jurisdiction,77 the court first determined that
Patterson had purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing
business in the forum.78 In making the determination, the court
considered Patterson's action of entering into the SRA, Patterson's
repeated transmission of computer software to Ohio via electronic links,
the fact that Patterson advertised the software on CompuServe's system,
and Patterson's initiation of events that led to the filing of the suit by
CompuServe. 7 These contacts were found substantial by the court
which stressed Patterson's deliberateness in reaching out from Texas to
Ohio to subscribe to and use CompuServe and in "conducting business
in Ohio."' The court concluded that the cause of action did arise from
Patterson's activities in Ohio and that exercising personal jurisdiction
over Patterson was reasonable.8 '
One of the earlier cases to deal with the nature of computer related
contacts between the defendant and the forum is PLUS System, Inc. v.
New England Network, Inc.s 2 Plaintiff PLUS Systems, Inc. ("PLUS")
is incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of
71. Id.
72. Id.
73.

Id.

74. CompuServe v. Patterson, No. C2-94-91, 20 Computer Law Rptr. 284 (unpub.) (S.D.
Ohio 1994).
75. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268.
76. Id. at 1262.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
78. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1266.
79. Id. at 1264.
80. Id. at 1264-65 (citing PLUS Systems, Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F.
Supp. 111, 118-19 and United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,706-07 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 74 (1996)).
81. Id. at 1267-68.
82. 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992).
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business in Denver, Colorado. 3 Its depository institutions issue plastic
debit and credit cards bearing the PLUS mark and accepts such cards
at automated teller machines ("ATMs") for use in banking transactions
such as withdrawals, deposits, transfers, and inquiries."
PLUS
established its PLUS mark as a nationwide identifier of the services
offered by PLUS.85 Defendant, New England Network, Inc. ("NENI")
is organized under the laws of Connecticut with its principal place of
business in Wallingford, Connecticut." Under agreement, NENI is a
"processor" member of the PLUS network entitling it to process twenty
four hour ATM transactions bearing the PLUS mark. 7 NENI was
responsible for processing transactions involving financial institutions
in its region. 8 These shared ATM networks enable customers to
process transactions through the ATMs of unrelated banks.8 9 Customers can determine if they can use an ATM by matching one of the
trademarks appearing on the ATM with the trademark on the card. °
When the customer enters the card at an ATM, the transaction is routed
from the ATM-owning bank through the PLUS computer system if
necessary, or through NENIs system to the issuing bank to authorize
the transaction.9 PLUS' central processing computer, which processes
over twelve million transactions per month, is located in Denver,
Colorado.9 2 For transactions that were not processed through PLUS'
system, PLUS required members to pay a royalty of three cents per
transaction.93 NENI refused to comply with PLUS' royalty rule and
PLUS brought this action for declaratory judgment in Colorado district
court." Defendants challenged the court's personal jurisdiction, which
was premised on diversity jurisdiction.95 The court looked toward the
Colorado long-arm statute, which allowed the court to assert jurisdiction
to the fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." The court held that the three-prong test to

83. PLUS Systems, 804 F. Supp. at 114.

84. Id.
85. Id.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

90.

Id. at 115.

91. Id.
92. Id.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 117.
96. Id.
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In determining
determine personal jurisdiction was satisfied.97
whether'NENI had purposefully availed itself of the forum state, the
court evaluated all of its contacts with Colorado, including their
knowledge that the agreement was with a Colorado company, the fact
that the agreement provided that it is to be governed by the laws of
Colorado, the payments made to Plaintiff in Colorado, and finally, the
contact between NENI's computers and PLUS computers in Colorado on
a regular basis." The computer connections included inter-member
processing of transactions, daily settling of accounts, and exception
handling procedures. 9 The court noted that had these procedures been
performed in person, there could be no dispute over minimum contacts.'
"Defendant's use of Plaintiff's computer system to effect the
same result is no less an availment of Colorado and its laws." 01
A third case, not dealing with infringement, but with federal obscenity
charges, is United States v. Thomas. 2 As the analysis moves further
down the continuum away from the easier cases, the non-computer
related contacts with the forum become less extensive, as in this case.
Defendants Robert Thomas and his wife Carleen Thomas operated the
Amateur Action Bulletin Board System ("AABBS") beginning in
February 1991 from their home in Milpitas, California."3 People could
access the AABBS through their computers using a modem and a phone
After callers became members of the service by paying a fee,
line.'
submitting a signed application form, and obtaining a password, they
could download explicit photographs in computer files called Graphic
Interchange Format ("GIF-).105 Additionally, members could request
via e-mail sexually explicit videotapes that were delivered by use of the
United Parcel Service ("UPS")."° A United States Postal Inspector,
responding to a complaint regarding the AABBS, accessed the service
from Tennessee by calling the AABBS' telephone number. 7 The
agent obtained a password using an assumed name and, using his
computer and modem, downloaded explicit GIF files containing
depictions of "bestiality, oral sex, incest, sado-masochistic abuse, and sex

97. Id.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 118-19.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
74 F.3d at 705.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
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scenes involving urination.""° He also ordered and received sexually
explicit videotapes using the e-mail function of the AABBS.' ° Defendants, in the Western District of Tennessee, were charged and convicted
of conspiracy to violate federal obscenity laws, knowingly using and
causing to be used a facility and means of interstate commerce for the
purpose of transporting obscene images, and shipping obscene videotapes
via UPS. ° Defendants challenged venue in the Western District of
Tennessee, claiming that they did not cause the GIF files to be
transmitted to the Western District of Tennessee, but that the inspector
accessed and caused the GIFs to enter Tennessee."' In determining
the propriety of venue, the court considered "'a number of factors - the
site of the defendant's acts, the elements and nature of the crime, the
locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of each
district for accurate fact finding."" 2 The court noted that the AABBS
was accessible to subscribers in other jurisdictions with the knowledge
of the defendants, who could have precluded the risk of liability in those
jurisdictions by limiting access to passwords."' While this case did
not involve an Internet connection, it nevertheless demonstrates the
extent to which a bulletin board operator, analogous to a single Internet
site owner,
can be held liable for information downloaded to users of the
4
system."
In Zippo Manufacturing Co. o.Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.," the contacts

between the defendant and the forum state were exclusively through the
Internet."' However, a traditional form of contact, the contract with a
forum resident, still existed. Zippo Manufacturing Company ("Zippo"),
located in Bradford, Pennsylvania, is the maker of the well known
"Zippo" lighters. Defendant, Zippo Dot Coin, Inc. ("Dot Coin") is a
California corporation with its principal place of business in Sunnyvale,
California." 7 Dot Coin has obtained the exclusive right to use the
domain names "zippo.com," "zippo.net" and "zipponews.com" from
Network Solutions, Inc., the provider of Internet domain names."'
108. Id.
109. Id.

110. Id. at 705-06.
111. Id. at 709.
112. Id. (quoting United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting
United States v, Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1986))).
113. Id. at 709-10.
114. The Thomas' were sentenced to two and one-half and three years respectively. See
Cook, supra note 24.
115. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

116. Id. at 1121.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1121 n. 3.
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Dot Corn uses these domain names to allow access to its Web page,
which includes information about the company, advertisements, and an
application for its Internet news service. 1 9 A customer could subscribe
to various types of news services by filling out an online application that
requires applicants to include their name and address.' 20 Approximately three thousand such subscribers are Pennsylvania residents,
which account for about two percent of Dot Corn's subscribers.' 2 ' Zippo
objected to Dot Corn's use of the word "zippo" in its domain name and
sought an equitable accounting and the imposition of a constructive trust
in the federal district court in the Western District of Pennsylvania."2
Dot Corn objected to the court's personal jurisdiction over the California
resident."2 The Pennsylvania long-arm statute authorizes personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents "[clontracting to supply services or things
in" Pennsylvania to the "fullest extent allowed under the Constitution
of the United States."2 4 The court analyzed whether it could exercise
personal jurisdiction over Dot Corn on this issue under the three-prong
test.125 The court held that Dot Corn had purposely availed itself of
the Pennsylvania forum by not merely advertising its services, but by
contracting with Pennsylvania residents, thereby "conducting electronic
commerce." 126 The selling of passwords to Pennsylvania residents that
allowed access to Dot Corn's services, and provided Dot Corn with profits
from Pennsylvania residents, was more than a "fortuitous" contact with
Pennsylvania. 27 The court held that if Dot Corn had not wanted to be
amenable to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, it could have refused to sell
passwords and services to Pennsylvania residents. 2 The court finally
concluded that the "nature and quality" of the Pennsylvania contacts
contacts, and the
were sufficient, the cause of action arose out of those
129
exercise of jurisdiction would not be unreasonable.
In the next case, Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.,'3s a Missouri
company, Maritz, alleged that CyberGold, Inc., a California based
company, was infringing Maritz's trademark via CyberGold's Internet

119. Id. at 1121.
120. Id.
121.

Id.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322(a)-(b) (1981).
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1122-23. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
Zippo, 957 F. Supp. at 1125.
Id. See World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126-27.
Id. at 1127.
947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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site on the World Wide Web."3' CyberGold's website is accessible by
anyone in Missouri 3with
Internet access using the domain name
"www.cybergold.com." 2 The website is currently used by CyberGold
to promote its upcoming service by which subscribers can receive
advertisements that are suited to their particular interests.'
When
users access the site, they are encouraged to "sign-up" for CyberGold's
upcoming service by submitting personal information, including name
and address. Then CyberGold automatically and indiscriminately
responds to each and every user who requests information." CyberGold objected to the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction and the court
analyzed the case under the Missouri long-arm statute and the federal
due process requirements.'3 5 Missouri's long-arm statute allows the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the extent of the
due process clause limitations." 6 The court held that Defendant's
activities satisfied the "commission of a tortious act" provision, reasoning
that infringement is tortious in nature and the activities have produced
37
the alleged effect in Missouri of causing Maritz economic injury
Finally, the court held that the Due Process Clause did not prevent the
court's exercise of jurisdiction over the Defendants.' 38 The nature and
quality of the contacts through the website were sufficient to establish
minimum contacts with the form because through them, "CyberGold has
consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all internet
users, knowing that such information will be transmitted globally."3 9
In this case, the courts have made a large leap down the continuum
away from the clear cut cases. In this case, unlike the first three cases,
the forum contact is initiated almost exclusively by the forum residents
with the exception of the automated computer response from the
defendant's computer. Additionally, no contracts existed between the

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1329.
Id at 1330.
Id.
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1329.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (1996). This section states:

Any person or firm, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, or any
corporation... submits... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts: (1) The transaction of
any business within this state... (3) The commission of a tortious act within this
state ....
Id.
137. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1331.
138. Id. at 1333-34.
139. Id. at 1333.
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defendant and forum residents. The exercise of jurisdiction is based
solely on fibn-traditional, Internet only contacts with the forum.
Another case in which the defendant's contacts with the forum involve
no contracts and are exclusively Internet-related is Inset Systems, Inc.
v. Instruction Set, Inc.'" Plaintiff, Inset Systems, Inc. ("Inset"), is a
corporation organized under the laws of Connecticut, with its principal
place of business in Brookfield, Connecticut."" Defendant, Instruction
Set, Inc. ("ISI"), is a corporation organized under the laws of Massachusetts, with its principal place of business in Natick, Massachusetts."
ISI obtained and used "inset.com" as a domain address to advertise its
goods and services.'" Inset, the registered owner of the trademark
"INSET," filed for damages and injunctive relief against ISI in federal
district court in the District of Connecticut.'" ISI objected to the
The court held that ISI's
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction.'
contacts with Connecticut were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over ISI.'" In analyzing the federal due process standards, the
court held that because ISI purposefully directed its advertising
activities toward Connecticut on a continuing basis, it purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of doing business there. 4 7 These advertising activities were considered purposeful availment because the
advertisements, unlike television and radio advertising, were available
on a continuous basis to any Internet user in any state.'" Finally, the
court held that its exercise of jurisdiction did not upset the notion of
"fair play and substantial justice" because of the minimal distance
between Connecticut and Massachusetts and Connecticut's interest in
adjudicating the dispute. 4 '
The final case, Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,'5 illustrates the
end of the continuum, where jurisdiction is not asserted over the

140. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
141. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 162.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 163.
144. Id. at 162.
145. Id. at 163.
146. Id. at 164. The Connecticut long-arm statute states that:
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this
state... on any cause of action arising... (2) out of any business solicited in this
state ... if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the

orders or offers relating whereto were accepted within or without the state ....
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411(c)(2) (repealed 1997).
147. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165.

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 973 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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defendant. Plaintiff Bensusan, a New York corporation, created and
owns "The Blue Note," a jazz club in New York City.'5 ' Defendant
King is an individual who lives in Columbia, Missouri and operates a
local club also called "The Blue Note."" 2 In April of 1996, King posted
a World Wide Web site on the Internet which contained marks that
allegedly infringed those owned by Bensusan.'" The computer server
on which the web site was actually located was in Missouri and allowed
general access to anyone around the world with access to the Internet."' The site contained general information about the club in
addition to a calendar'of events and ticketing information. 5 King's
Web page contained a disclaimer purporting to distinguish it from the
New York City Blue Note owned by Bensusan.'" The disclaimer
originally recommended Bensusan's establishment to anyone in the New
York City area and included a "hyperlink" to Bensusan's Web page;
however these were removed when Bensusan objected to King's Web
site. ' 7 Bensusan brought an action for trademark infringement,
trademark dilution and unfair competition in the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of New York, and King moved to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction."s
Bensusan relied on sections 302(a)(2) and 302(a)(3)(ii) of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules, 159 the state's long-arm statute, to
support its claim that the New York court could assert personal
jurisdiction over Defendant in this action."
The first provision of
section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over any nonresident who
"commits a tortious act within the state" if the cause of action arises
from the tortious act.' 6' Citing cases that held trademark infringement occurs "where the passing off occurs, i.e., where the deceived
customer buys the defendant's product in the belief that he is buying the
plaintiff's," the court noted that the offering for sale of an infringing copy
in New York, even if no sale results, is sufficient to vest a court with

151. Bensusan, 973 F. Supp. at 297.
152. Id.

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 297-98.

157.

Id. at 298. A "hyperlink" is "highlighted text or images that, when selected by the

user, permit him to view another, related Web document." Id. at 298'n.2 (quoting Shea v.
Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 USLW 3323 (1996)).
158. Id. at 298.
159. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 302(aX2)-(aX3)(ii) (1990).
160, Bensusan, 973 F. Supp. at 298.

161. Id. at 299.
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personal jurisdiction. 62 The court determined, however, that the
establishrment of a Web site with a telephone number for placing orders
of an allegedly infringing product is not an offer to sell the product in
New York, and personal jurisdiction over the Missouri defendant is not
proper." The court reasoned that "lilt takes several affirmative steps
by the New York resident, however, to obtain access to the Web site and
utilize the information there," including accessing the Web site via either
knowledge of the DNS address'" or the use of a search engine,
telephoning the box office to reserve tickets, and traveling to Missouri
to pick up the tickets." Under those facts, the infringement would
It is important to note,
have occurred in Missouri, not New York."
however, that the court recognized that a different result may have been
reached had the infringing goods been shipped to New York."17
In determining whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would
violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, the court held that
King had done nothing to purposefully avail himself of the benefits of
The court analogized the creation of a Web site to the
New York.'
mere placing of a product into the stream of commerce"6 9 Assertion of
personal jurisdiction in New York would have required that King
actively seek to encourage New Yorkers to access his site, conduct some
business in New York, or have some presence in New York other than
a Web site that can be accessed worldwide. 70
VII.

CONCLUSION

The continuum that exists today in case law regarding the exercise of
jurisdiction over nonresident Internet infringers of copyrights and
trademarks is, as yet, a skeleton. A tenuous line exists between cases in
which the infringer is or is not availing of a forum when using the
Internet as medium for infringement. When trying to draw this line, or
threshold point in the continuum, parties and courts should consider the
observations of Chief Justice Warren announced almost fifty years ago,
that

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 6.
Bensusan, 973 F. Supp. at 299.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 301.
Id. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (plurality opinion).
Bensusan, 973 F. Supp. at 301.
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[a]s technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between
States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a
similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and
transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less
burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements for
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved .... 7
Chief Justice Warren could not have imagined the extent to which
"technological progress has increased the flow of commerce" by the use
of the Internet.'72 One of the earliest cases to deal with computer
communications also noted that "while modern technology has made
nationwide commercial transactions simpler and more feasible, even for
small businesses, it must broaden correspondingly the permissible scope
of jurisdiction exercisable by the courts.""' These predictions were
applied to the present technology, the Internet, in Zippo.174 The court
in Inset followed the Zippo court's lead. 7 ' Perhaps it is time for other
forums to do the same. Due to the nature of the Internet, the possibility
of trademark or copyright infringement is so extreme that the time has
come to heed Chief Justice Warren's foreshadowing. The risk of
offending the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" has
been substantially reduced by the ease of transportation and communication between forums. 176 Additionally, the importance of local adjudication of these issues is high because of the locus of these types of
damages. 7 7 Cases such as Inset, Maritz, and Zippo should be seen as
models for future litigation. These courts have realized the global and
local damage caused by the infringement of trademarks and copyrights
on the Internet, and the need to provide a local forum in which injured
plaintiffs can seek to enforce their rights.
JAMES H. AIKEN
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